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## FREEDOM: ITS RELATION TO THE PROOF OF DETERMINISM.

THIS paper is one more attempt to prove the reality of human freedom. Any one glancing over the magazine literature now appearing will observe that the subject is in one of its periodical acute stages of discussion. That is my excuse for broaching it,—that, and the consideration that the view here advanced and defended is simple, and I hope will be made clear, so that it can be accepted or rejected with little waste of time and thought. But first it will be well to get clearly in mind what form of proof is competent in the premises and what form is not.

The assistance offered by the various syllogisms of Formal Logic need not long detain us. The basis on which they rest is the assumption that the major and minor propositions have already somehow been established; and what is here to be set forth is precisely the nature of the ultimate basis on which we must depend for establishing propositions. I shall presently mention the syllogistic form in which the crucial part of the proof I shall offer will be cast. It will then appear that the difficulty consists, not in meeting the requirements of Formal Logic, but rather in establishing the truth of the two premises. Brushing Formal Logic aside, therefore, as of comparatively slight assistance, two types of proof remain. For the present purpose they may be distinguished as proof by induction and proof from presupposition.

Without going into the intricate questions of the kind and quality of evidence competent to establish an induction as probable or certain, what an induction attempts to prove is that certain sensations, feelings, or objects of perception are bound together, as regards their appearance in our consciousness, by determinate and fixed relations of sequence or coexistence, or both. I shall attempt to show in the sequel that inductive proof can neither prove, nor can it disprove, the reality of freedom.

The proof by means of presupposition is of a different character. Assuming some proposition to be proved, an analysis of the process involved in the establishment of that proposition, and an examination of the evidence offered for it, are made with the purpose of showing what must be true in order that the proposition in question should be true. Any proposition established by induction, or the inductive process as a whole, may be examined for the purpose just mentioned. My attempt will be to show, by such an examination, that either freedom is real or else truth is inaccessible for us. If the disjunction be legitimate, not only do all scientific laws—logical, mechanical, physical, vital—depend for their establishment on the reality of human freedom, but also a law denying human freedom—supposing it possible to establish it on other grounds and without violence to other considerations—would here meet with check, since it would be inconsistent with a presupposition requisite to its proof. The proof may obviously be stated in the form of a disjunctive syllogism. The difficulty, as already mentioned, consists in establishing the premises. A more detailed examination of the forms of proof by induction and from presupposition in turn, in their application to freedom, will, I hope, make the position clear.

Before an examination of the process of induction, a few words on the character of the results it furnishes will be useful. One of the fictions which it seems hardest to banish from scientific and philosophic thought is the belief in the efficacy, the efficiency, the power, of a cause to produce an effect. This misapprehension, no doubt, is much aided in retaining its vitality by the use of the word "force." When in the midst of scientific procedure, scientists use the word with a very definite meaning, a meaning which has in it no slightest tinge of the notion of production. But let either scientist or philosopher discuss the question of freedom, and immediately the notion of production is somehow smuggled into their conception of cause. The more wide-spread use of the term "law of nature" is doing something to lay the ghost. For the fact of the matter is that all science can do by means of induction is to establish laws of nature,—formulæ, to use

a more precise term. A chemist puts hydrogen and chlorine together in a jar in a dark room, by the window. In the course of the day the sun comes to shine upon the jar and the two substances spring together into chlorhydric acid. Here, evidently, is an observed sequence: nothing more is observed. The chemist expects that sequence will be repeated whenever he may choose to try the experiment. What basis that expectation has does not concern the present inquiry. The only fact present is the fact of sequence already mentioned. Of precisely the same type are laws of nature more intricate and minute. They describe sequences and spacial relations, and scientists expect repetitions of the sequences and other relations observed.

Now, if the notion of compulsion is to be introduced, it would be well to get in mind what is meant by compulsion. If a boy is kept in after school-hours, if his resignation is extorted from a dishonest official, if a nation is forced to pay a large indemnity,—in all these cases compulsion is felt. The school-teacher, the official superior, body of indignant citizens, or whoever it may be, and the nation exacting the indemnity, on the other hand, know by experience what it is to compel. In a word, both compelling and compulsion are certain emotions, and it will not do to attribute them to inorganic nature, or indeed to nature at all, under pain of lapsing into old-time animism.

Many attempts to prove freedom seek a term in the process of choice which can be one of two or more things. They bring before the mind the different motives, the appeal each makes to the individual, the fact that some are strong, others weaker, and then they introduce something called a choice which, if they are successful, must be a wholly indeterminate act. A common way of representing the situation is to figure two or three motives as tugging away at the person in different directions, he remaining entirely passive for a time, but finally pulling himself together, and pushing out into the direction of one of the tugs. It need not be said that such a description is widely at variance with the facts. If the situation is to be described in terms of hypothetically definite and

separate mental elements, it at least cannot be described in static terms. The truth rather is that there is a constant coming and going before the mind. An impulse to action arises. Another, felt to be contradictory, opposes it. Some circumstances connected with impulse A and also attractive, let us say, occurs and re-enforces A. But some other circumstance occurs connected with B,—that is, involved in the choice of B, and re-enforces B. Suppose, then, that B is as yet somewhat less attractive than A ; it may then happen that some circumstance involved in the choice of A, but this time in itself disagreeable, shall occur. And so with B. This process may continue indefinitely. Either A or B may be to such an extent re-enforced as to drive the other from the field of consciousness. A second alternative may be that neither A nor B, but a third course of conduct, C, should have slipped in between them and won the day. Or, as a third alternative, which is the second slightly disguised, it may be that the desire to decide at all costs or the hatred of indecision may finally appear and accidentally, as it were, give the advantage to A or to B. The situation is somewhat like that which would occur if the weights belonging to a sensitive balance were used with one not at all sensitive. Two nearly equal weights are put into two pans; neither moves. Additions are made to one pan and the other, somewhat indiscriminately, and finally, without previous warning, the beam tips. But describe the state of the case as one will, it is impossible at once to describe it and to leave room for capricious choice. To establish freedom it is necessary to show that at some point there is *no* definite order of sequence. To describe a sequence is to make it definite. Or, to put the same things into terms of induction, to establish an induction is to show that, given one or more elements in certain spacial or temporal positions, there will follow the same or different elements in different or the same positions. Now, in order to prove freedom it must be shown that the elements first mentioned and their position are not sufficient to determine that the subsequent elements and their position shall follow. But this is a proof from ignorance, which may at any time be overthrown by the dis-

covery of unobserved antecedents, and of the fact that these, together with the antecedents previously known, or alone, are invariably followed by the elements in question and their position. If this statement is correct, it is evident that the attempt to prove freedom by induction is futile.

But if it is impossible to prove freedom inductively, it is equally impossible to disprove it. A generalization may be merely empirical,—*i.e.*, subject to correction on wider experience. Among the many experiences in kind and number of a physician's life, for a number of years, including the rounds of professional and domestic life, his literary, social, and political occupation, periods of travel, possibly, and many more, he picks out a certain number of symptoms exhibited by a few among his patients. He picks these out because he observes that the same symptoms occur in all the patients, and that in all they follow the same order. Let us say he calls the disease hydrophobia. Some time after him comes another physician, who declares that some of his patients exhibit the symptoms already described, but that in addition to them there is a certain state of the organism, and that it is the cause of the disease. Moreover, he declares that his predecessors were wrong in regarding the series of symptoms they described, ending with death, as fatally fixed in their sequence. He has found this condition, and by the application of certain remedies he can prevent the occurrence of death. Admit that after a while the medical profession comes to agree with the last physician. A new order of sequence is then admitted to be typical of hydrophobia. The question is, are all laws of nature equally provisional with the law of the sequence of symptoms in hydrophobia just mentioned? Are all formulæ describing empirical sequences and spacial relations at the mercy of new facts? If that is the case, it would seem possible to establish freedom without any difficulty at all. And, it must be mentioned, many of the most acute speculators are of that opinion. According to them the situation may for our purposes be described somewhat as follows: Of a large total of facts there comes to our knowledge a few of them at a time. Comparing the groups of facts which occur in the

experience of different people, and in that of the same person at different times, certain relations among these facts have been observed. Certain typical relations have repeated themselves in the different experiences a large number of times. It is possible that they will repeat themselves again, but that is wholly problematic. That might be interpreted in this wise. The experience that each consciousness has of another never being direct, but only by means of the other's representative, his body, in the consciousness of the first, it might be thought that this representative varied in concomitance with the variations of the states of the consciousness it represents. Now, all these consciousnesses, to continue, might be "free causes" in their desires and acts of will. Further, the different consciousnesses might vary in their self-consistency. The consciousness behind a stock, a stick, or a stone might be practically without caprice, might be habit-bound, while that behind the body of a maniac might be full of caprice. According to this hypothesis, in so far as the relations under observation were those obtaining among stocks, sticks, stones, and their like, no change would be discovered in them, the reason being, according to hypothesis, that their consciousnesses are wholly self-consistent. As regards the relations among the bodily elements of the routine business-man, very little change would be observed, while in the case of the maniac the formula would have to be in constant process of correction. So the situation might be figured,—so, or in some manner analogous, and under such an hypothesis the place for freedom is obvious. To make it complete, it would of course be necessary to work it out in very much greater detail. My purpose was to mention it simply, not to expound it or make it plausible.

Suppose, however, that this is not the case at all. Suppose that there is, in truth, a world formula. It is needless to say that we are not in possession of such a formula as yet. It is also obvious that many, possibly all, of the so-called laws of sequence, already discovered, are merely provisional. But the hypothesis I wish next to face is that the ideal of science is, in fact, somewhere and somehow realized. If it be true in that sense, is freedom disproved? I do not ask in what sense

it can be true, although, to make the discussion less difficult, I shall assume that its truth consists in its presence to some very wise consciousness. The consciousness armed with such a formula could, by substituting any value of T in it,—A.D. 1453, for instance,—read off the total situation of the world at that time. He would know not only the condition of the physical universe proper, but would, by hypothesis, know every feeling, thought, and wish of every human being at that time existing. Just so could he discover the state of things throughout the world and in every secret breast at *this* moment of time. If any one is in the midst of some moral conflict this wise consciousness can tell its issue as well as its present existence. In short, there is for him not only complete knowledge of the past and present, but complete knowledge of the future. Did any of us have that formula, he could predict every act of each of his acquaintances, and every act of his own, as long as any existed. The hypothesis is clear enough. Suppose it to be true. Is there anything in it inconsistent with freedom? To my mind, nothing whatever. As already said, such formulation cannot prove freedom. My particular thesis here, however, is that it is equally impotent to disprove it.

I must here interpose a few words upon the kind of conscious facts which the world formula cannot explain away. It is well known that tastes differ, and that they change. I hear a snarl and a growl and a snap, and immediately drop everything to rush out and look at the dog-fight; you, in the adjoining room, hear and recognize the sounds, but pay no attention to them. Sarah Bernhardt is announced as playing *La Tosca*. Your friend Jones stands all night in line and pays an exorbitant price for a ticket. A free ticket would not induce your friend Smith to go. Some prefer George Eliot's novels, others swear by Balzac; a third class worships Tolstoi. In the same way the tastes of childhood are not those of maturity, nor are those of maturity the tastes of old age. Nor is it only in the comparatively unimportant question of tastes that men change and differ. Men represent all kinds of character. The ideals, moral or æsthetic, of one man awaken not

the slightest glow of enthusiasm in another. And however such curious phenomena as changes of heart, regenerations, reformations, or lapses from grace be attempted to be explained, their existence is an undoubted fact. Such novelties and differences in ideals cannot be neglected by any theory claiming to base itself upon facts. They are facts just as much as it is a fact that the rays of light coming from Mars and Jupiter differ in color, or that a falling body has a definite acceleration at a certain time and place. No competent formula can do violence to the facts of either kind. It must have a place for all.

So much being premised, let me try to explain why a world formula does not disprove freedom. It may be better to build up from a simple illustration, examining each step narrowly on the way. Imagine the universe shrunk down to a single consciousness, playing a game of chess with himself. Leaving the question why he plays chess rather than engage in some other occupation aside for the time being, suppose him to be wholly free in the choice of each move. He may play one side with an intricate and well-defined plan, the other with no plan at all, or both with, or both without; that is immaterial. Having finished the game, he shall be limited for his experience to remembering it and speculating about it. Suppose him to have a vivid memory, good powers of calculation, and considerable ingenuity in devising theories. If, then, he be curious to discover some formula in terms of which the moves of the game may be expressed, a formula less intricate but otherwise substantially the same in kind as the world formula already mentioned, he will, with his powers, undoubtedly be able to frame one. Let it be noted, in passing, that there will be a large number of repetitions in the course of the game. The knight will always move in his own curious fashion, and so with the other pieces. There will be repetition in this case, because that is the kind of game chosen. Now, the question is, Will the fact that the player has found a formula competent to express all the spontaneous actions he has performed render those actions one whit less spontaneous than they were before its discovery? It would be absurd to suppose so. Suppose

him to stop in the midst of the game and work out a formula for the first half, and suppose it to turn out that that formula applies to the whole game, the player, for the sake of argument, having in the second half made no effort to that end; still his spontaneity is not affected.

Let us imagine a second consciousness, B. Suppose that B knows A very well, knows his habits of mind and his preferences, "sympathetically," as we say. He knows him as you know your appointee as cashier of a bank; you are assured that under no circumstances will he misappropriate the funds. Just so Lord Salisbury knew Sir William White when he sent him on the Turkish mission. He knew what kind of a diplomat Sir William White was, and guessed pretty shrewdly how he would play the game of diplomacy. Well, let consciousness B know consciousness A after the same fashion, only much more minutely and exhaustively; let him know him so thoroughly that before A has made the first move, B knows the whole course the game will follow. Suppose B, with that knowledge in mind, to formulate the game just as A was conceived to do a short time since. B's knowledge being so accurate by hypothesis, the formula will accurately describe the whole course of the game. Is A's spontaneity in the least interfered with by that additional fact? I am sure no one will say that it is. Now, let one more personage be added. Suppose that A and B play a game of chess together. B has no more knowledge of A under these new circumstances than I have of you, or you of me, we being strangers who meet for the first time. A and B are to be free to choose their moves just as A was in the example first considered. It is one of their caprices to play in alternation, and this continues throughout the game. Then let there be a third consciousness, C, who knows both A and B sympathetically, as the B of our last example knew the A. Evidently C will know beforehand the whole course of the game. Suppose C to formulate it before its beginning; will that fact interfere with the spontaneity of either A or B? Not any more than the formulation last considered interfered with A's freedom.

Now, instead of A and B merely, vary the occupations into infinite intricacy until they are as many as those of the past, present, and future of our own world. In the same way multiply the individuals indefinitely. Suppose, again, the existence of the sympathetic consciousness which knows beforehand the every action of each, and suppose that consciousness to work out a world formula with the same purely theoretic interest, abstaining from interference with any of the individuals. Evidently nothing essentially different from the conditions last considered, in the case of the three consciousnesses, has been introduced.

It may be asked why the sympathetic consciousness is given a part in the drama. It is because sympathy is our name for the kind of knowledge which one consciousness gets of another. One consciousness never sees another, hears, touches, or tastes it; it can only get at it through sympathy. If a time transcending consciousness which knows the consciousness of all the actors throughout the drama presentatively, and at one flash, as you or I may know our just past moment of consciousness, be introduced, sympathetic knowledge is no longer a necessary hypothesis. But I wish to put the case in terms as familiar as possible; and sympathy is a well-known form of knowledge, one that occurs many times daily in the consciousness of each one of us. Whatever the form of knowledge, the possibility of knowledge without influence, or with influence limited in extent, is the point to keep in mind.

Knowledge with influence purposely limited, every wise parent has experienced in his own person. Knowing his child well, he leaves him to follow his own impulses as long as they are wise and worthy, seeking to influence him only in case they are the opposite. Now, it is just this kind of influence that the laws of heredity, say, may be supposed to exemplify. Suppose that in the case of A and B playing the game, and C predicting its course, a slight complication be introduced. Suppose that C is not entirely passive, but has at his command two other beings, D and F. And let C decide to set D whispering advice at the ear of A whenever he thinks of making a certain move,—of moving his bishop,

say. And let him set F at B in the same way whenever he thinks of moving his castle. Suppose, further, that although D and F are forced to give advice, what advice they are to give is left to them to decide. So complicated, the situation of the chess game is identical in every essential particular with the actual state of things about us. As the advent of D and F into the chess world is not wholly dependent upon B and A, so it is with the advent of any one of us into the real world. And just as, in the case of D and F, the fact that they cannot control their advent is in no wise inextricably bound up with their inability to control their actions after their advent, so, hypothetically, at least, can our own case be conceived. Heredity, then, and in general what will be the representative in one consciousness, if any of the acts of another can be explained as the means chosen by the sympathetic, and, according to our last-introduced complication, partially interfering consciousness for the realization of *its* ends. But given those representative facts, each consciousness may assume towards them the attitude he pleases. When B makes a move, a certain fact appears in A's consciousness. How A will treat that fact will depend wholly on himself. Knowing or not knowing what E will do when he moves his bishop, B is perfectly free to will to move it. That E comes to give him advice, and what fact B's willing will introduce into A's consciousness, these by hypothesis depend, not on him, B, but on C. I fear the illustration has been ridden to death, but I hope it will make the situation clear. The position, in a word, is that neither prediction nor formulation can in the least serve to disprove freedom. Its reality or illusoriness must be decided on other grounds. I have a line of considerations to offer which seem to me competent for the proof of freedom. I have so far attempted to demonstrate that induction, perfect and imperfect, are equally unable to answer our question. It is now time to bring forward the facts and the methods which set up some positive claims. The method, it will be remembered, was called reasoning by means of pre-supposition. Before considering the precise question, a few preliminary words must be said.

Deceived by the outer and foreign guise under which facts of science appear, when used as arguments in opposition to freedom, we are apt to imagine that men have taken no important part in establishing their truth. The manner in which formal logic is commonly taught and understood has much to do with this. So many people get the notion that thinking is a purely mechanical operation, that a man thinks as water runs down hill. It is commonly asserted, without much explanation, that logical machines have been constructed, and that they are rather better thinkers than most men. They never make mistakes, while men make mistakes very frequently. One thing is certain: logical machines cannot ask questions nor invent hypotheses, and these form a large and most important part of thinking. And whether thinking be mechanical or not, every truth *we* know and can bring forward in argument is a truth attained by *us* with our processes of thinking. Whatever, then, is necessary in order to the possibility of becoming acquainted with, or getting access to, truth, scientific or other, must *a fortiori* be itself true. If freedom be proved one of the indispensable prerequisites to the attainment of truth, and if, further, the process of truth-getting can be shown to be an activity essentially the same in kind as some of the practical activities, then surely the reality of freedom can be accepted as proved.

Truth-getting reaches results so diverse in kind from those attained by other forms of activity that the essential identity in process is often lost sight of. For our present purpose, though the distinction is one of degree rather than of kind, it will conduce to simplicity to divide all activities into impulsive and deliberate. Impulses, it is commonly said, drive, while motives draw, into action. Impulsive action has no end in view; deliberative has an end. My own conviction is that impulsive action has an end in mind; that the end is vague and ill-defined, rather than absent; but let that pass. It will suffice to show the identity in process in the two cases of "theoretical" and "practical" activity of the deliberative kind, where, besides, the processes are more easy of access for examination. I get up on the right side of the bed; in a res-

taurant I go to a table next to the wall, if any be vacant; I meet a lady I know, and lift my hat; I merely nod to Johnson across the street; I always refuse olives, but generally help myself to oranges, or *vice versa*; A's statements I accept at their face-value; when B makes a statement I set myself to ferreting out his ulterior motive; in none of these instances do I stop to think and arm myself with reasons for my action; I merely act. It is actions of this kind, which are largely in the majority, which are to be left out of consideration. But summer is approaching, and you have an opportunity to go to Europe, an invitation from a friend to spend a month at his summer cottage, a chance to join a yachting-party, while there is a large accumulation of important business which will surely go wrong if you leave home. What are you going to do? You carry the alternatives around with you in some out-of-the-way pocket of your mind, drawing them out for inspection as opportunity offers. You consult friends, and finally you decide on one of the alternatives. You have your notion of what a prudent, right, rational, or wise manner of spending the summer is, under the circumstances, and in accordance with that you decide. Another instance: a minister cannot accept some article of the creed, or does not approve of some part of the practice, of his denomination. Yet he is sufficiently convinced that he is doing useful work in his ministration. Emerson's case suggests itself as in point. What is he to do? What ought he to do? He passes through a period of more or less prolonged and agonizing indecision, balancing the pros and cons, seeking light in various directions. Finally, it may be that some striking instance of his usefulness decides him to stay, or it may be that some pungent experience shall show how untenable his position is. It may be that careful consideration without any new experiences will make clear to him the proper line of conduct and permit him to decide. In any event he has a standard of ministerial conduct, shifting, probably, possibly enlarging, possibly narrowing, but at all events a standard, and in accordance with that he decides. What is your judgment of Kipling's stories, of Pierre Lotti's, or of the paintings of the impressionist

school? You have, or after more or less hesitation get, a standard of writing or painting, and judge them accordingly. All these cases, with the last on the border-line, are "practical" as distinguished from "theoretical." Now, my contention is that theoretical cases are of precisely this same type.

I wish to discover truth on some particular question. Did Brutus stab Cæsar? With an intricate mass of assumptions as a basis, I set out in search of pertinent facts, and such facts I can "evidence." I do not search the Hebrew Scriptures. According to my standard of evidence they furnish none. Nor, for this same reason, do I try to discover the conformation of the heavens on that fateful day. With the evidence thus selected I try to decide which of the facts, singly or in combination, make for, which against, the stabbing. And on the weight of the evidence, once more judged by *my standard*, I decide. In a manner quite analogous, Newton formulated and established the law of gravitation. If the myth of the apple be true, on observing its fall the thought flashed into his mind that all bodies might tend to approach one another, and that their mutual attraction might be capable of formulation. Using his standards at every step, both as to evidence and its weight, and as to processes of reasoning,—for the laws of formal logic are merely our standards of flawless reasoning,—he came to believe that his formula was established as a truth. Others examining it believe the formula to accord with their standards, and also accept it. The examination just made will be used for another purpose soon, but for the present the point to be brought out is that the kind of activity exercised in truth-getting, and truth-seeking, for that matter, is the same in kind with activity called practical. Or, to put the same thing in another form: deliberation and choice are the essential elements in all decisions, practical, æsthetic, or theoretic, and in all three types these elements are essentially the same. But a full understanding of this point depends upon the next, which is the keystone of the proof, since whether two facts are "essentially" similar can only be decided when the purpose to which they are to be put is made clear.

In considering the examples of the last paragraph we have been concerned in showing that the truth-getting activity involves as a necessary part of itself teleological judgments the same in type as those involved in moral or æsthetic decision. It is now necessary to insist that the worth of a teleological judgment depends upon the worth of the conscious being making it. A moment's thought will show how inevitably we are driven to that conclusion. We talk so much about "facts" and "evidence" that we are apt to forget that they are such (*i.e.*, facts and evidence) for us only in virtue of our teleological judgments. When a man comes forward with a statement, if we are cautious persons and have reason to distrust his competence in the premises, we no doubt ask for the evidence in support of his statement. But we often forget that in so doing we are by no means doing away with the need of authority. Nor are we "letting the facts speak for themselves." Facts cannot speak. We are merely arrogating authority to ourselves to distrust the man's judgment, and to set up our own in its place as competent. Squirm how we will, in the last resort, authority, our own or that of another accepted by our own, is the basis on which all that is true for us, and each detail of it, rests. The Practical Reason has the primacy. So much being clear, is there any reason in holding that beings can be mere machines, and yet be entitled to such authority? Take the logical machine, already considered. Does the appearance of a proposition on its face, and ground out by its mechanism, endow that proposition with one whit of assent-compelling authority? The authority for that statement must be traced back to the man who devised the machine. To the degree that we are assured that he was at once competent and honest do we trust that statement. So much is sure: whenever a man is engaged in judging of the evidence and reasoning adduced in support of a proposition,—whether that proposition be, All men are subjects in thraldom to the necessary laws of Nature, or another,—his decision is of value only in so far as he is a free cause, a being of worth and weight. The presupposition without which his judgment, either for freedom

or for necessity, is of no value, is that he is free. This, of course, is Kant's postulate of freedom. We cannot think any more than we can act without that postulate. But the consideration which changes the postulate, the attitude of the brave man who ranges himself on the side of the right, and takes the risks because they are worth taking, into a presupposition logically prior to the judgment of freedom or necessity,—the consideration which does this is brought to light when we observe that the judgment attempting to establish freedom or necessity is itself teleological. With this in mind, we see that in the act of attempting to say, We are not free, we covertly, but inevitably, assert that we are free. The logic of the situation stamps on the words, I am not free, a meaning the opposite of that they usually express.

To sum up, in conclusion, I have attempted to prove, first, that induction cannot prove freedom; second, that, neither in its present form, nor if it be filled full of perfect accuracy, can induction disprove freedom; third, that, inasmuch as our assertion of necessity depends upon our right to form teleological judgment, that assertion, the ordinary meaning of the words to the contrary notwithstanding, is itself a covert or disguised assertion of freedom; and, fourth, that the essential identity in type of "theoretical" and "practical" decision renders the latter a sharer in the freedom proven for the former.

SIDNEY E. MEZES.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.